A fully patched FortiGate can still end up in the FortiBleed dataset. FortiBleed is the name researchers gave to a large credential compromise campaign against internet-facing FortiGate firewalls and SSL VPN gateways, first reported in mid-June 2026. It has no CVE and no patch to install. On 6 October 2026 the FBI and the US Secret Service were still warning that attackers keep scanning exposed Fortinet firewalls.
Last reviewed: 20 November 2026.
What is FortiBleed?
FortiBleed is an access-broker operation. The operators collected working administrator and VPN credentials for FortiGate firewalls, cracked stored password hashes offline, and sold access to other criminals. Researchers could see how it worked because the operators left their own backend server exposed, according to the FBI and Secret Service advisory.
Fortinet’s PSIRT team published its analysis on 19 June 2026 and said this is not a new Fortinet vulnerability. Fortinet’s reading is that attackers reused credentials from earlier incidents and brute-forced devices with weak passwords and no multi-factor authentication.
FortiBleed timeline
| Date (2026) | What happened |
|---|---|
| 2 June | Sophos MDR records its earliest confirmed case: a FortiGate configuration file exported to an external IP address. |
| 13 June | Researcher Volodymyr Diachenko publicly flags an exposed attacker directory containing FortiGate credentials. |
| 16 June | SOCRadar publishes its analysis of the campaign. |
| 19 June | Fortinet PSIRT publishes its analysis of the reported credential compromise. |
| 6 October | The FBI and US Secret Service issue a joint advisory. Attackers are still scanning, and some victims have been locked out of their own devices. |
How many FortiGate firewalls are affected?
Published totals differ because each source counts something different. SOCRadar’s figure, which the FBI and Secret Service advisory cites, is more than 86,644 compromised devices across 194 countries. Recorded Future counted 73,932 FortiGate firewalls with exposed credentials. Early reports put the number near 30,000 before further analysis raised it. Treat every figure as reported by the vendor that produced it, not as an audited total.
How the FortiBleed attack worked
The FBI and Secret Service describe the operation as a pipeline:
- Scan the internet for exposed FortiGate SSL VPN portals.
- Run credential stuffing and password spraying with credentials from earlier Fortinet leaks and infostealer logs.
- Take password hashes from the devices they get into. Researchers also observed configuration files being exported to external IP addresses.
- Crack the hashes offline on a rented GPU cluster running Hashcat and Hashtopolis.
- Check and rank the cracked credentials by the value of the target, log in, and create new administrator accounts on the firewall for persistence.
- Move into the internal network, enumerate Active Directory, and sell the access.
The advisory also says some victims lost access because the attackers changed passwords or deleted the original admin accounts. Reporting links the access brokers to ransomware affiliates, including INC/Lynx and Payload.
Why a fully patched FortiGate can still be exposed to FortiBleed
The FBI attributes the campaign to reused or leaked credentials and to legacy SHA-256 password storage. Firmware version alone does not cover either one.
Starting with FortiOS 7.2.11, 7.4.8 and 7.6.1, Fortinet changed how administrator passwords are stored, moving from SHA-256 to PBKDF2, which is much slower to crack. The upgrade does not convert every account at once. Fortinet community articles say an administrator’s password stays stored as SHA-256 until that administrator logs in again, and an older article says until the password is changed. Either way, installing the new firmware does not re-hash every account. A hidden old-password setting also keeps the previous SHA-256 hash for backward compatibility after the update.
You can see the difference in a configuration file. A stored password that starts with SH2 is SHA-256, and one that starts with PB2 is PBKDF2.
Exposure matters as much as hashing. Researcher Kevin Beaumont said the management interface was exposed to the internet on most of the impacted devices. Qualys rates the risk highest for internet-facing FortiGates without MFA, with reused or legacy-hashed credentials, or with earlier exposure to known exploited Fortinet CVEs.
Is FortiBleed related to CVE-2026-24858?
Fortinet says the activity is not related to any recent incident or advisory. The two issues still overlap in practice, because a device that was exposed to an earlier Fortinet bug carries a higher FortiBleed risk. If you have not audited your FortiGate for the FortiCloud SSO bug yet, read the FortiGate admin login bypass audit checklist as well.
Three questions to ask about your own firewall
- Can anyone on the internet reach your admin login page or SSL VPN portal?
- Do your admin and VPN accounts require multi-factor authentication?
- Has every admin account logged in or changed its password since your last firmware upgrade?
If any answer is no or unknown, the companion fix checklist walks through each step on FortiOS 7.6.
PDPA note for Malaysian organisations
A FortiGate configuration holds VPN usernames and other data that can identify people. Since 1 June 2025, Malaysia’s PDPA has required data controllers to notify the Personal Data Protection Commissioner as soon as practicable once they have reason to believe a personal data breach has occurred. Whether your situation meets that bar is a question for your data protection officer or legal adviser. This post is not legal advice.
FAQ
Does FortiBleed have a CVE?
No. Fortinet said this is not a new vulnerability, and the FBI and Secret Service attribute the campaign to reused or leaked credentials and legacy SHA-256 password storage.
Does updating FortiOS fix FortiBleed?
Updating is part of the fix, since PBKDF2 hashing arrived in 7.2.11, 7.4.8 and 7.6.1. It is not enough alone. Administrator hashes stay SHA-256 until each admin logs in again, old hashes can remain in a hidden setting, and exposed management ports and missing MFA stay open until you change them.
Which FortiGate devices are most at risk?
Devices with the admin interface or SSL VPN reachable from the internet, no MFA, reused or legacy-hashed credentials, or earlier exposure to known exploited Fortinet bugs.
How many devices were compromised?
Reports range from about 30,000 in early coverage to 73,932 firewalls with exposed credentials (Recorded Future) and more than 86,644 devices (SOCRadar). The totals differ because each source counts different things.
What should I do first?
The FBI and Secret Service list three key actions: restrict external management of your devices, terminate all admin and VPN sessions and reset credentials, and require phishing-resistant MFA on remote access and admin accounts.
Conclusion
FortiBleed has no patch, so firmware version cannot tell you whether you are safe. Three things decide your exposure: whether the admin interface and SSL VPN are reachable from the internet, whether MFA protects those logins, and whether your stored administrator passwords are still SHA-256. Check those first, then follow the fix checklist.
Sources
- FBI and US Secret Service joint advisory JCSA-20261006-01 (6 October 2026)
- Fortinet PSIRT blog: Analysis of Reported Credential Compromise of FortiGate Devices
- SOCRadar: FortiBleed investigation
- Sophos advisory: FortiBleed credential exposure
- Qualys: FortiBleed credential reuse and internet-exposed FortiGate devices
- Cloud Security Alliance research note on the FortiBleed credential campaign
- Fortinet Community: Enforcing PBKDF2 as hash function for administrator accounts
- Future of Privacy Forum: Malaysia’s data protection and AI ethics frameworks
